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Abstract: In this essay, I analyze a series of first-person homeless 
accounts and reader responses in the Las Vegas Sun newspaper in 
order to highlight the social conditions that support or inhibit 
empathy. I review the rhetorical study of empathy and incorporate 
work from social psychology and moral philosophy to identify and 
examine the conditions of assessing victimhood and recognizing 
self-other overlap. I find the irony of empathy to be that the very 
social forces that would necessitate an expansion of empathy also 
inhibit it through increasing social division and the reluctance of 
readers to recognize their own vulnerabilities in the position of 
others. I contend throughout that a focus on empathy as an 
individual experience overlooks the social production of empathy, 
which is more appropriately considered from a rhetorical 
perspective.  
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Late in the summer of 2010, freelance writer Rodger Jacobs was 
running out of time and options. He had moved from Los Angeles 
to Las Vegas to care for his ailing mother, who had since died. He 
and his girlfriend, Lela Michael, were about to be evicted from their 
rented home. He did not know where they would go or how they 
would manage. To express his frustration, Jacobs wrote a letter to 
the editors of the Las Vegas Sun newspaper. The editors replied by 
contracting Jacobs to write a first-person series of articles titled 
“The New Homeless: My Story.” At that time Las Vegas, once 
among the nation’s greatest growing economies, was the national 
leader in foreclosures and unemployment. A year earlier, the Las 
Vegas Sun had won a Pulitzer Prize for Public Service reporting, so 
a series focusing upon the plight of the new and nearly homeless 
corresponded well with its mission. An editor’s note to open the 
series explains part of the intent, relating Jacobs’s situation to 
readers by stating, “the Great Recession has created the new 
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homeless, people with good work histories who are victims of 
unemployment and foreclosures. We won’t necessarily find them 
sleeping on a downtown sidewalk. We asked Rodger Jacobs to tell 
his story, in his own words.” The contrast of “new” and supposedly 
“old” homeless is troubling and speaks to the social issues involved 
in who is considered a victim worthy of empathy and who is 
granted space to tell their stories. Still, the series effectively 
highlights the economic uncertainties facing much of the 
population and amplifies the voice of one of those affected. As the 
series developed in three parts over four months, Jacobs chronicled 
his experiences as he and Michael walked the fine social and 
economic lines dividing those who have homes from those who do 
not. 
The Las Vegas Sun series is notable for how it highlights the 
social conditions upon which empathy is determined and contested. 
These are evident in the nearly seven hundred and fifty reader 
comments the articles attracted, including responses by Jacobs, 
Michael, and the series editor. Each article is accompanied by a 
documentary video. The first article in the series is titled simply “I 
Am Frightened” (Jacobs, Aug. 2010). It serves to introduce Jacobs 
and to explain how he came to be on the verge of homelessness. The 
second, published a month later, is titled “Hostile Toward 
Homelessness” and updates Jacobs’s situation as he and Michael 
were now living in a Budget Suites of America extended-stay hotel 
(Jacobs, Sept. 2010). Much of the second article is concerned with 
reader reactions to the first. That trend continues with the third 
article, titled “Homelessness and the Indignity of Hurtful Speech,” 
in which Jacobs responds to his critical readers and tells of his 
plans to move back to Los Angeles, saying goodbye to a community 
that he feels has turned its back on him (Jacobs, Dec. 2010). Jacobs 
began writing the series to describe his difficult situation, but as it 
progresses he becomes increasingly concerned with hurtful reader 
responses and how people in the community understand one 
another. 
In this essay I analyze Jacobs’s series to highlight the social 
conditions that help determine empathy. Empathy often is 
presented as something somebody has, as though it were located 
inside an individual’s head. I demonstrate instead how empathy is a 
social phenomenon, created through the social conditions that 
inform our interactions and the ways we understand and respond 
to one another. These social conditions are evident in my analysis 
of the Las Vegas Sun series, especially those conditions related to 
the assessment of suffering and responsibility and our places in 
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relation to others in a community. (Full disclosure: I worked at the 
Las Vegas Sun prior to the series being published.) I read the series 
with attention to how Jacobs is positioned socially, in how he is 
read and how he writes. Since empathy is unevenly distributed, 
some members of a community are granted greater access to 
empathy than others.  
Understanding Empathy as a Social Phenomenon 
My analysis follows the social logics and values enacted in what 
Daniel Gross describes as a “contoured world of emotional 
investments, where some people have significantly more liabilities 
than others” (Gross, 2007, 3, emphasis in original). I view my 
inquiry as continuing a rhetorical approach that understands 
emotions as socially and historically constituted. A rhetorical 
perspective makes clearer the contingencies of empathy and, 
through that approach, allows for a critique of the ways and 
conditions upon which empathy is determined. 
I begin with a review of the rhetorical study of empathy and how 
I, like Gross, understand empathy as a socially determined 
rhetorical phenomenon. I then consider two key social conditions of 
empathy: assessment of victim status and responsibility; and 
recognition of the self-other overlap that acknowledges the 
significance one person holds for another as members of a 
community with shared vulnerabilities.  
Victim status, communal membership, and shared 
vulnerabilities all depend on social values and positions. Evident in 
the series and my analysis are competing ideologies and discourses 
that work to support or inhibit empathy. I conclude by surveying 
wider media responses to Jacobs’s series and the dismay of writers 
who read the series as indicating a breakdown in community 
relations during times of economic distress. I identify an irony of 
empathy as the tendency of the very factors that necessitate greater 
empathy to be those that undercut the social conditions for it. My 
argument is that empathy is not simply an individual psychological 
event but socially determined and rhetorically mediated, meaning 
that empathy is a product of the social situation at least as much as 
of individual psyches.  This is not to say that empathy does not vary 
by individual or that individuals do not experience empathy in how 
they feel and think about one another. They do. Instead, I argue 
that the social conditions of empathy are too often overlooked in an 
emphasis on empathy as an individual phenomenon or as occurring 
between two individuals without taking larger social conditions into 
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consideration. I attempt to account for those here. Empathy is not 
simply a question of neuroanatomy. It is as much a question of 
social conditions and who is determined worthy of it and who is 
not. In times of increasing economic distress, widening social 
inequality, and fraying community relations, empathy itself is 
imperiled, as is clear in Jacobs’s series. A rhetorical understanding 
of empathy helps us shift attention from individual readers and 
writers to the social conditions that support or inhibit it.  
Empathy: A Literature Review 
Rhetorical Studies 
Empathy has long been a rhetorical concern. As Dennis Lynch 
notes, “Empathy used to be at the center, at the heart, of rhetorical 
studies” (Lynch, 1998, 5). Empathy is traditionally aligned with 
emotional appeals and identification. Conceptions of empathy 
became increasingly suspect in rhetorical and cultural studies due 
to association with moral universalism and the liabilities of 
empathic overreach. Recent interest in mirror neurons, moral 
judgments, community cohesion among differences, and affect and 
the body have reinvigorated studies of empathy. In much of this 
literature, empathy is evoked as a discrete personal event. However, 
as Ann Jurecic reminds us, “Affects such as empathy—as well as 
love, shame, disgust, terror, and happiness—are more than 
personal” (Jurecic, 2011, 11). Empathy is more than personal: This 
understanding of empathy is in line with the work of theorists such 
as Gross and Sara Ahmed, who have pushed for a rhetorical 
understanding of emotions as not merely personal or neurological 
phenomena but as occurring in socio-historical spaces. Following 
philosopher Amy Coplan, accordingly, I understand empathy as a 
simultaneously cognitive and affective event that allows us to 
attempt to understand “what it is like to be another person” 
(Coplan, 2011, 6). But whereas Coplan emphasizes the constitutive 
psychological processes of empathy—affective matching, other-
oriented perspective-taking, and self-other differentiation—I 
emphasize the conditions that work to determine empathy as a 
social and rhetorical phenomenon.  
A cognitive as well as affective understanding of empathy is 
favored by Kristie Fleckenstein, who writes, “As a complicated 
mixture of affect and rationality, empathy lends itself to 
deliberative discourse—to negotiation, debate, and persuasion—in 
the public sphere and serves as the foundation for social justice” 
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(Fleckenstein, 2007, 707).  Fleckenstein builds upon the work of 
psychologist Martin Hoffman, as well as on Martha Nussbaum’s 
theory of compassion, in an attempt to see empathy as mediated 
through language and, as Hoffman writes, serving as “the spark of 
human concern for others, the glue that makes social life possible” 
(Hoffman, 2001, 3; Nussbaum, 2001). Understanding empathy as 
language-mediated, combining affect and cognition, and as a key 
element in building communities, highlights empathy’s value as a 
rhetorical concept.  
Perhaps the most significant rhetorical work related to empathy 
is Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification. Burke places 
identification at the very core of persuasion, writing, “You persuade 
a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, 
tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with 
his” (Burke, 1950, 55, emphasis in original). For Burke, this process 
is not a single rhetorical event but the product of “a general body of 
identifications” Burke, 1950, 24, emphasis in original). That 
general body of identifications contributes to the rhetorical 
situation that determines the possibilities for empathy. Diane Davis 
has expanded on Burke’s concept of identification. Reading Burke’s 
treatment of identification alongside Freud, she collapses the 
distance between self and other to present identification as working 
through “an a priori affectability or persuadability that precedes 
and exceeds symbolic intervention” (Davis, 2008, 125, emphasis in 
original). Davis supports her argument by citing advances in 
neuroscience, namely the discovery of mirror neurons, to move 
identification beyond individuals and symbolic mediation to 
include a state of being and potential for identifying together. While 
an emphasis on mirror neurons can distract from the social reality 
of empathy, Davis uses this work and Freud’s to argue for a 
persuadability that exists prior to and in excess of intentional 
argument. This makes persuasion always part of the rhetorical 
situation. We are already to a degree identified or not identified 
with others prior to our encounters. In this sense, the conditions of 
empathy largely are determined by social and situational conditions 
even before one person meets another.  
More recent rhetorical studies of empathy have focused on 
intercultural communication and the use of empathy in the 
advancement of social justice. Lisa Blankenship offers a theory of 
“rhetorical empathy” as building on Burke’s identification through 
“appeals to emotion and personal connection based on shared 
experience” (Blankenship, 2013, 2).  She identifies rhetorical 
empathy as a form of “strategic essentialism” that can be useful in 
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inviting identifications for the promotion of equal rights 
(Blankenship, 2013, 4). Peiling Zhao examines the functions of 
empathy in rhetorical borderlands where both the empathizer and 
the empathizee might challenge each other’s understanding and 
subjectivity. As she explains, “An intersubjective rhetoric of 
empathy asks readers in intercultural encounters to position each 
other as subjects, to engage each other’s emotions; not through 
identification either with other’s emotions or pure rational 
reasoning, but through mutual and simultaneous recognition of 
difference and commonality” (Zhao, 2012, 70).  
Zhao focuses on intercultural communication, but a similar 
dynamic underlies all empathic exchanges. I view Zhao’s work as 
continuing that of Lynch, who also found the contested nature of 
empathy to be both a liability and an asset. Lynch uses the 
metaphor of proximity to theorize how writers can invite readers to 
identify with them while also purposefully frustrating readers in 
that identification, a strategy writers may use to inhibit easy 
empathy and instead promote the difficult work of trying to 
understand other people. Lynch finds that such texts “seduce us 
into ambiguous social spaces—by using the very obstacles to 
empathy we have been discussing—and by using those obstacles as 
possibilities for social exchange rather than as reasons for refusing 
interaction” (Lynch, 1998, 11). Empathy then becomes the reason 
for and field on which more nuanced exchanges might happen, with 
fuller discursive considerations of both commonalities and 
differences.  
My analysis of Jacobs’s series of articles draws on the work 
reviewed above by extending the rhetorical study of empathy to 
identify and analyze key social conditions that help determine 
empathic encounters, or their failure. The significance of empathy, 
especially to whom and by whom it is extended, as well as to whom 
it is denied, often is as much a situational effect as an interpersonal 
one: It varies due to social positions, values, commitments, and 
means of interaction. Like Zhao, I incorporate psychological 
concepts of empathy to better capture complex empathic 
interactions, and I place these in conversation with rhetorical and 
philosophical theories of empathy. 
Interdisciplinary Contributions 
Explicitly rhetorical studies of empathy are illuminated by 
treatments in other fields. One site of interdisciplinary conversation 
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is afforded by Nussbaum’s theory of compassion (Nussbaum, 
2001). Nussbaum draws upon an extensive philosophical and 
rhetorical tradition while also turning to contemporary 
psychological research. She arrives at three elements in the 
cognitive structure of compassion: (1) the “belief or appraisal that 
the suffering is serious rather than trivial;” (2) “the belief that the 
person does not deserve the suffering;” and (3) “the belief that the 
possibilities of the person who experiences the emotion are similar 
to those of the sufferer” (Nussbaum, 2001, 306). The third 
condition is derived from Aristotelian philosophy and adds to the 
idea of “eudaimonistic judgment” in which “the person must 
consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her 
own scheme of goals and ends. In effect, she must make herself 
vulnerable in the person of another” (Nussbaum, 2001, 319). I view 
shared vulnerability to suffering and eudaimonistic judgment as 
working in tandem with the related and broader condition of a 
“self-other overlap,” as proposed by Adam Galinsky and others for 
the creation of social bonds (Galinsky et al., 2005). These elements 
together produce a social condition of empathy that includes shared 
possibilities, vulnerabilities, recognition of a common humanity, 
and significance in one another’s lives.  
In drawing on Nussbaum’s cognitive elements of compassion, I 
do not mean to give the impression that compassion and empathy 
are interchangeable. Nussbaum recognizes as much when she 
writes, “If empathy is not clearly necessary for compassion, it is a 
prominent route to it” (Nussbaum, 2001, 332). This is not to ignore 
the important distinctions between empathy and compassion as 
positions. Empathy leads to and influences moral judgments. It 
does not depend on congruence of judgment, as compassion tends 
to. In feeling compassion we generally take up a moral position 
parallel that of another, but, still, you can empathize with 
somebody you do not necessarily support. Indeed, you can 
experience empathy as an unpleasant call on your conscience or as 
an unflattering reflection of yourself in another. Others, 
psychologist Paul Bloom for example, position compassion as less 
emotionally and affectively engaged than empathy (Bloom, 2016). 
The affective quality of empathy, which Hoffman describes as 
giving empathy motive force and heat, is part of empathy’s appeal 
(Hoffman, 2001). Nussbaum is concerned with the role of emotions 
in forming judgments and appraisals of others. I add to her work 
attention to how appraisals are socially determined, how the ways 
we feel about and judge others are based upon social positions and 
our conceptions of community. Two of the most vital social 
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conditions of empathy arise where responsibility and the self-other 
overlap are determined. I focus my own analysis there. 
The more readily we see somebody as a victim the more easily 
we might empathize with them. A greater challenge is to empathize 
with those whom we do not see as victims, perhaps because we view 
them as at fault for their fate. The appraisal of fault often is a 
question of context, history, ideology, and social conditions. Those 
who understand one’s life conditions to be primarily a result of 
social and historical forces largely beyond one’s control may be 
more apt to empathize with people who are victims of the same 
forces (Bracher, 2013). Those who view one’s life conditions to be 
largely a result of one’s own decisions may be more likely to assign 
responsibility and resist empathizing with the victims of social 
forces. These attitudes inform the social conditions that underlie 
appraisals of responsibility and support or inhibit empathy. In 
Literature and Social Justice, Mark Bracher defines these ways of 
considering others as faulty person-schemas of autonomism versus 
a more correct situationism (Bracher, 2013). Those schemas 
broadly align with George Lakoff’s theories of moral categories in 
political thinking, with the conservative “Strict Father” morality 
favoring autonomism in concert with responsibility and self-
reliance, while the liberal “Nurturing Mother” morality emphasizes 
care and makes empathy itself a priority (Lakoff, 2002, 162-167). 
Dominant political logics, person-schemas, economic forces, and 
other social conditions can be understood as doing much of the 
work in producing possibilities for empathic encounters. Although 
questions of responsibility overlap with political morality, the 
assessment of responsibility remains a critical social condition for 
the contestation of empathy. As will be clear in Jacobs’s series, 
assessments of responsibility and victim status are much disputed. 
Empathy as Seeing Ourselves in Others 
The empathic social condition of recognizing a self-other overlap is 
built on simultaneous recognition and negotiation of difference. 
Burke’s concept of identification is useful in this context because of 
his attention to the necessity of difference in order for identification 
or any act of communication to take place (Burke, 1950). He writes, 
“For one need not scrutinize the concept of ‘identification’ very 
sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: 
division. Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall” 
(Burke, 1950, 23). Burke’s insight is that identification is possible 
only if there is some difference beyond which one might identify, 
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some division that gives cause for seeking in rhetoric similarities 
and understanding among differences. That division is itself a social 
construction, resulting from identities and positions. There is no 
need or possibility for empathy if there are no differences for one to 
empathize across and different individuals to empathize with. The 
possibilities for empathy are determined by the kinds and degrees 
of division in any social context. I understand empathy as always an 
approximation that depends upon the simultaneous realization of 
both differences and commonalities, which often are socially 
constituted.  
The shared significance in the self-other overlap can be traced 
all the way back to the Aristotelian idea that pity requires a belief 
that we and our loved ones have similar vulnerabilities and 
possibilities for suffering, as must the victims with whom we would 
empathize. Aristotle supports this understanding of pity, his closest 
comparable term to empathy. He argues that in order to 
understand the suffering or emotional conditions of others we need 
to be able to relate them to our own capacities and experiences. The 
social significance of pity is clear when Aristotle writes, 
Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain at an apparent 
evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does 
not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall 
ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall 
us soon…And, generally, we feel pity whenever we are in 
the condition of remembering that similar misfortunes 
have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to 
happen in the future (Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.8, 1385b2, 
1386a7). 
Aristotle is arguing that the assignment of personal responsibility 
inhibits pity because we pity only the undeserving sufferer. More 
importantly for the condition of self-other overlap, he contends that 
we need to understand ourselves as having or as capable of having 
vulnerabilities similar to those of another. If we do not, we will have 
trouble feeling pity or, I would add, empathy. Finally, Aristotle 
comments on the importance of personal experience in recognizing 
a self-other overlap. He also realizes that we recognize that overlap 
not only through personal experiences and capacities but also 
through family and friends. As Hoffman has argued, this is one way 
to leverage the familiarity bias—the bias that we most readily 
empathize with those most like us—as a tool of empathy rather than 
an obstacle, by imagining those close to us in the situation of a 
supposed victim, a move he calls “multiple empathizing” (Hoffman, 
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2001, 24). Pity differs from empathy because pity depends upon 
imbalances in social positions. One typically pities another of lesser 
social standing, while empathy is enabled through similar social 
standings.  
The social conditions of self-other overlap also reinforce 
Nussbaum’s assertion that empathy requires eudaimonistic 
judgment (Nussbaum, 2001). This is the requirement that one 
believes the other person matters, that the life of the other holds 
significance for one’s own life, and that the other should be 
included within one’s circle of concern. Eudaimonistic judgment 
can be based upon an understanding that one and another are 
members of similar communities, a condition for empathizing that 
exists prior to the encounter itself. It can also build upon attention 
to the personal and human dimension of an issue. Moral 
philosopher Arne Vetlesen highlights the importance of this 
attention when he writes, “Missing the human dimension of the 
situation, I also, and for that very reason, miss its moral dimension” 
(Vetlesen, 1994, 179). The idea of a shared humanity—that there are 
some similarities in the human experience and that human 
concerns transcend difference—contributes to self-other overlap by 
acknowledging shared vulnerabilities and possibilities. A shared 
humanity also establishes a common community so that one 
believes that another’s suffering is one’s own concern. This is akin 
to psychologist Robert Kegan’s idea of the interindividual form of 
identity, which Bracher describes when he writes, “When I have an 
interindividual identity, every other human being is an essential 
component of my sense of self, such that when anyone else suffers, 
I suffer, and when anyone else experiences joy or contentment, so 
do I, through that person” (Bracher, 2009, 62).  
I do not intend the idea of a common humanity, however 
important it is as an ideal, to somehow negate important 
differences, a negation that tends to work in the interests of the 
more powerful. These are not all-encompassing commonalities. I 
mean to recognize those differences even while affirming that 
critical differences do not cancel out the basic potential similarities 
in human experience or, more importantly, the value of concern for 
others and for creating the social conditions that would enable such 
concern, those being a more egalitarian and just world. 
Acknowledging the significance that another holds for oneself is a 
powerful social condition that goes a long way in supporting 
empathy. 
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In general, then, the social conditions of empathy are those 
social forces, values, logics, and possible subject positions that 
create or inhibit possibilities for empathy prior to the encounter 
itself. They are conditions that empathy may work with or against. 
They are often overlooked in theories of empathy that stress the 
individual experience qua individual. Highlighting these social 
conditions is the work of this analysis of empathy. Two critical 
conditions focused upon here are (1) the designation of the victim 
as not at fault for his or her situation, especially through 
understanding the influences of history and social conditions upon 
another’s life situation; and (2), recognition of a self-other overlap 
through a shared humanity, shared worthiness of concern, and 
shared potentialities and vulnerabilities. These conditions are made 
explicit in Jacobs’s series and the reader comments. Awareness of 
these conditions is important in broadening our rhetorical 
understanding of empathy because they inform many of our 
debates over social policies, the plights and positions of others, and 
how we might and should respond to those situations. With these 
social conditions of empathy in mind, I return to Jacobs’s account 
of his life among the nearly and newly homeless and the responses 
of his readers in the Las Vegas Sun. 
Responsibility, Victimhood, and Homelessness  
Empathy with the homeless is fundamentally a question of social 
positions and values. Homelessness is not something that resides in 
the individual. Homelessness is a social phenomenon, one 
determined by conditions of poverty, access to healthcare, and 
other factors. The fact that Jacobs is introduced in an editorial note 
as one of the “new homeless,” as one who should not be blamed for 
his homelessness because he has a “good work history,” 
underscores the dominant social logic that homelessness is tied to 
individual character and responsibility rather than social 
conditions. Jacobs offers his story to counter that logic. He does so 
by a certain role reversal of writer and audience: He addresses 
himself to readers who are assumed to share commonplaces about 
personal failure and choice whereas he, a writer on the verge of 
homelessness, has learned to refuse to deploy those commonplaces. 
There are clear social hierarchies among the homeless. Some are 
more deserving of empathy than others. Also at issue are the social 
positions of the would-be empathizers and how they understand 
their own vulnerabilities to homelessness and their communal 
commitments. These social conditions are evident throughout the 
discussions of responsibility and victimhood in Jacobs’s series.  
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Jacobs writes to strengthen his position as one of the homeless 
who are entitled to empathy. He is a victim of the economy, of 
unscrupulous lenders and landlords, and of fate. In “I Am 
Frightened” Jacobs describes himself and his girlfriend, Michael, as 
“brutalized by the economy” and as in debt to a “merciless payday 
lender” (Jacobs, Aug. 2010). There is the “draconian” property 
management company, the state bureaucracy he has to contend 
with, and even the “cockroaches and black widow spiders” that 
Jacobs must pay an exterminator to eradicate (Jacobs, Aug. 2010). 
In the second article, “Hostile Toward Homelessness,” Jacobs 
further presents himself as a victim of a generally hateful 
readership and a largely indifferent community (Jacobs, Sept. 
2010).  
Jacobs describes the day the first article is published. He spent 
much of that day responding to allegations of “sloth,” “arrogance,” 
“weak moral and ethical judgment,” “alcoholism,” and more, as 
readers attacked his character in order to assign him responsibility 
(Jacobs, Sept. 2010). He writes that the pain he felt in reading the 
comments has been enduring. He first thanks those who have 
shown him and Michael sympathy and support and then adds, “But 
any warmth of kindness was lost to judgmental creatures wrapped 
in their conservative ideology and intoxicated by their own 
venomous rhetoric” (Jacobs, Sept. 2010). He is arguing against 
readers who misunderstood his situation and, more significantly, 
against a preexisting ideology that has nothing to do with him 
personally but nevertheless works to undermine an empathic 
reading. In the third and final article, Jacobs again likens the 
economy to a malevolent force. Worse for him than the economic 
pain or the pain in his joints is the hurtful speech generated by the 
series. He writes of the “mean-spirited remarks that have fueled my 
decision to leave town” (Jacobs, Dec. 2010). Jacobs thanks those 
community members who offered assistance and donations, but the 
suffering that he describes is sufficient to compel him to leave. In 
his telling, he is twice the victim, first to the economic conditions 
that produced his homelessness and second to the “conservative 
ideology” and “venomous rhetoric” that fuel the mean-spirited 
comments of the readers (Jacobs, Dec. 2010).  
Many of the commenters voice a strong individualist ideology 
and argue that Jacobs is responsible for his situation. Here it is 
worth noting that at the time of the series the Las Vegas Sun 
website asked that readers comment through registered accounts 
but allowed them to register those accounts under any display 
name they chose. The Las Vegas Sun likely did so in the idea that 
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forcing commenters to register would create more of an online 
community and lead to higher quality comments. While they are 
commenting through registered accounts, the true identity of the 
commenters can remain anonymous behind user names. This 
anonymity further increases the distance and limits the sense of 
social connection between Jacobs and his readers.  
With greater distance, the move to empathy is weakened. The 
moral obligation that Vetlesen attributes to empathy as a demand 
placed on the viewer appears to be diminished when the viewer can 
act as an anonymous participant (Vetlesen, 1994). Some 
commenters are upset that Jacobs does not assume more 
responsibility. Commenter Area51 writes, “Rodger basically does 
not want to take responsibility for his actions” and “Oh, please. The 
'they are picking on me' attitude is wearing thin” (Jacobs, Sept. 
2010, posts 124, 172). Area51 sees Jacobs as appealing for status as 
a victim while denying his own responsibility. In a detailed 
comment, Thia writes, 
Tell me sir have you learned and grown as a person from 
this hardship? Tell me what do you intend to do 
differently so you do not end up in this position again? 
What offends so many, sir, is that you are not in as bad 
of a place as you believe yourself to be in. What offends 
so many sir is that even with all the kindness you have 
received you write in a manner that sees only what you 
do not have and did not get. What offends so many, sir, 
it that you write in a manner that says I am a victim pity 
me, and takes no responsibility for your own choices. 
Not once have I read that you admit you regret anything. 
Not once have I read that you in anyway are humbled or 
grateful. You write, sir, like the kindness and generosity 
of others is your right and due you (Jacobs, Sept. 2010, 
post 106). 
Thia not only denies the validity of Jacobs’s claim to empathy, but 
also is offended by the ways in which he portrays himself as a victim 
of social forces and circumstance.  
Much of Thia’s comment argues in accord with commonplace 
conservative beliefs regarding responsibility and victimhood. 
People demonstrate responsibility by taking adverse experiences as 
opportunities for learning and growth, promising to change, 
acknowledging their errors, and demonstrating work toward 
improvement. Thia does not see enough recognition of the proper 
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commonplaces that govern this topic in Jacobs’s article to warrant 
empathy. She picks up on an idea frequently stated in the 
comments, that Jacobs acts as though something is owed to him. 
Who is granted and who is denied victim status is politically and 
culturally defined. Those who recognize the determinant power of 
social forces on another’s station in life are more willing to see 
somebody on the verge of homelessness as a victim of the economy. 
Conversely, those who do not see such social forces as having a 
determinant power on one’s station in life are more likely to 
attribute Jacobs’s situation to a personal failing such as pride or 
laziness. Bracher observes as much in his critique of autonomist 
schemas and their contributions to social injustice (Bracher, 2013). 
Ideology rather than individual judgment and experience then may 
be seen as contributing to empathy in any given situation. 
The commenters who voice a competing logic that does entitle 
Jacobs to empathy do so by focusing on the role of unexpected 
events in an individual’s life. They also point out that everybody 
makes mistakes, a way of asserting the self-other overlap, that they 
too have made mistakes. They contend that it is not the reader’s 
place to judge Jacobs’s decisions, only to empathize with him. For 
example, in response to Jacobs’s article, “Homelessness and the 
Indignity of Hurtful Speech,” TheNextOpinion writes, “As for the 
people saying that bad decisions contributed to this situation- you 
are absolutely correct. Unfortunately, I've never met a person who 
made perfect decisions every time” (Jacobs, Dec. 2010, post 103). 
The intention is not to absolve Jacobs of his responsibility for his 
situation, but rather to argue that responsibility is not the real issue 
because everybody makes mistakes. Similarly, arguing for 
recognition of circumstances beyond Jacobs’s control, 
OpinionVegas adds,  
As I read this unfortunate story, I couldn't help but think 
about what our society has become? It seems that many 
among us have forgotten the importance of helping 
people less fortunate than ourselves and have developed 
a sense of denial in concluding that other people's dire 
straits are always because of things that they did or did 
not do with their lives and that they could exert control 
over all of life's variables—that simply is not possible. 
Have those unforgiving souls actually forgotten that 
many things in life—good or bad—are undeniably 
influenced by circumstances totally beyond one's 
control? (Jacobs, Dec. 2010, post 15). 
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OpinionVegas views Jacobs’s situation as “unfortunate” and 
admonishes others for being too quick to judge Jacobs rather than 
to offer support. Relatedly, psychologist C. Daniel Batson has 
shown that feelings of empathy can lead to altruistic actions to help 
others (Batson, 2011). OpinionVegas attributes the rush to 
judgment to “a sense of denial” because people want to view others 
as responsible for their own fate so that they will not have to fear 
the likelihood of a similar misfortune in their own lives. Notably, 
OpinionVegas finds the fault not with Jacobs but with what society 
has become, as conditions of empathy have more to do with social 
values, ideologies, and the uneven distribution of responsibility—
weighing most heavily on the homeless themselves—than they do 
with individual guilt. This view conforms to Bracher’s situationist 
schema, from which it follows that positions in life are often the 
products of much larger forces that are not under personal control 
(Bracher, 2013).  
Jacobs showcases empathy and a more appropriate non-
evaluative response to the situation of others when he writes in the 
second article of going for a haircut. “I did get a haircut — from a 
kind Wal-Mart beautician who was recently homeless with two 
teenage sons to care for,” he writes, adding, “I did not ask what 
‘mistakes’ she made that put her in that perilous position” (Jacobs, 
Sept. 2010).  Here Jacobs is modeling the type of empathy that he 
would expect of his readers. Empathy is acknowledged not by those 
in a higher social position—those who would look down upon and 
judge Jacobs as a way of distancing him and his position and 
vulnerabilities from themselves—but from the perspective of a Wal-
Mart beautician who has recently found herself in a similar social 
position. The possibility of empathy in this case depends on the 
likelihood that somebody has been in a similar social position or 
can imagine being so, a move that levels standing between Jacobs 
and his respondent.  
Jacobs notes earlier in the article that a friend had warned him 
to be prepared for negative reader responses:  
“People are uncomfortable with and hostile toward the 
topic of homelessness,” my friend Joseph Mailander 
cautioned. “More often than not, they want to believe 
that the homeless got in their situation because of 
mistakes that they have made rather than confront the 
uncomfortable truth that fate is often random and 
undeserved and homelessness could happen to anyone 
in the blink of an eye,” (Jacobs, Sept. 2010).  
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Jacobs’s series becomes a place for enacting and engaging 
competing ideologies, those that attribute homelessness largely to 
the homeless and those that view homelessness predominantly as 
the product of social forces. Perhaps because of this, Jacobs is 
reluctant to assign himself responsibility in contributing to his 
situation, because doing so might strengthen the position that 
homelessness is the fault of the homeless. 
Responsibility is a recurring issue throughout the series and the 
reader comments. It speaks to how homelessness is assessed and 
who is considered responsible for their homelessness. For those 
arguing along the lines of homelessness as an individual product, 
Jacobs is not a victim. He is instead largely the cause of the 
situation in which he has found himself. These commenters do not 
empathize because assigning responsibility allows them to focus on 
the decisions that Jacobs made, fixating on his failure to 
acknowledge complicity in this situation rather than considering 
those circumstances that are beyond Jacobs’s control and attending 
to the ways in which he is now suffering. Numerous commenters 
focus on factors from Jacobs’s personal life, on which they draw to 
inform their reading of his deservingness of empathy and his 
assignment to positions of victim or non-victim. Jacobs is seen 
smoking in one of the article photos and having a beer in one of the 
videos. In his freelance writing career, he had previously worked as 
a screenwriter for adult films, which is mentioned in the comments. 
These biographical details are presented as evidence of personal 
failings and are cited as reasons that Jacobs is not entitled to 
empathy. Reference to these factors demonstrates the social 
considerations and moral values that underlie how the position of 
victim is determined. The empathy that would or would not be 
extended to Jacobs was determined by his social position and 
dominant social values before he sat down to write his articles. In 
arguing for his empathy, he has to argue against these dominant 
ideologies. 
Self-Other Overlap: A Condition For Empathizing 
The social condition of self-other overlap requires that someone 
views another’s life as having some significance for one’s own, such 
as membership in the same community. Self-other overlap also 
requires belief in some commonalities in what people experience or 
may experience. Cultural, historical, social, and personal 
interpretations and expressions of human experiences differ widely, 
but to recognize a self-other overlap we need to have some 
confidence that there is something shared within our experiences of 
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what it means to be human. This is necessary in order to relate 
one’s experiences to those of another. The self-other overlap as a 
social condition for empathy is built upon the premise that what 
happens to somebody else could happen to me or at least is 
relatable to me through some shared vulnerabilities. If the prospect 
of being unemployed is not a possibility in my life, if my social 
position is such that I am sufficiently insulated from all concerns of 
homelessness, then I may find it more difficult to empathize with 
somebody who has recently lost his job and who is now on the verge 
of homelessness.  
My use of self-other overlap is based on Galinsky’s psychological 
concept in conjunction with Nussbaum’s explanation of 
eudaimonistic judgment (Galinsky et al., 2005; Nussbaum, 2001). 
Within psychology, self-other overlap refers to seeing ourselves in 
others and others in ourselves, especially through perspective-
taking. As Galinsky et al. write, “Through both seeing the self in the 
other and seeing the other in the self, perspective-takers are able to 
navigate a complex social world, coordinating their behavior with a 
diverse set of individuals, and establishing multicultural social 
bonds” (Galinsky et al., 2005, 110-111). But the possibility of seeing 
ourselves in others depends upon how we and others are socially 
positioned and defined, making the possibility of self-other overlap, 
and therefore of empathy, a social product. Nussbaum’s 
understanding of eudaimonistic judgement does not require 
perspective-taking but is a process of evaluation in which the 
suffering of another is deemed personally significant. The overlap 
here occurs in looking for commonalities, sharing vulnerabilities, 
and recognizing the importance of our lives to one another. The 
particulars of human lives differ in all kinds of critical and unequal 
ways, but to recognize a self-other overlap we need to have some 
confidence that there is something common within our experiences 
of what it means to be human and to believe that those experiences 
matter. 
When Jacobs writes in support of the condition of self-other 
overlap, he is essentially arguing for his place in the community and 
his likeness to other community members. In describing himself 
and Michael as good, hardworking, community-minded people, for 
example, Jacobs is also making a case for their similarity to an 
audience of similar folks. In “I Am Frightened,” Jacobs writes of 
himself and Michael, “We have been hardworking people all of our 
lives, honest and forthright, passionate lovers of art and culture, but 
soon we may need to learn how to read books and study art under 
the glare of a streetlamp” (Jacobs, Aug. 2010). Jacobs is describing 
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himself and Michael in terms that many of his readers would to 
apply to themselves and to other members of their community. He 
is saying, in essence, we are like you, equal in social standing and 
concern.  
The editor’s note at the beginning of the series makes a similar 
argument in describing the “new homeless” as “people with good 
work histories,” which solidifies Jacobs’s and Michael’s standing by 
distinguishing them from those homeless who supposedly do not 
have good work histories. Jacobs adds, then, that although they are 
upstanding people they are in a desperate situation, implying that 
his readers could just as easily find themselves in a similar spot. If 
we are like you, then you are also like us. If not for different 
circumstances, some of the readers might be in a situation very 
much like that of Jacobs and Michael. Indeed, the entire premise of 
the series is that the experiences of “The New Homeless” are 
common in Las Vegas during the Great Recession and that Jacobs 
and Michael are representative of many people facing uncertain 
prospects. 
Jacobs is fond of evoking a sense of community at the end of his 
articles. At the end of the first and second pieces he attempts to 
showcase how his life may intersect with the lives of his readers to 
demonstrate that they are part of a shared community. For 
example, he ends his first article with a scenario in which his path 
crosses those of his readers: 
And so, in your travels across the Las Vegas Valley, 
should you encounter a weary-looking man resting 
against a streetlight, one hand on a wooden cane, the 
other clutching a dog-eared paperback of a Georges 
Simenon Inspector Maigret novel—my escapist lit choice 
of the moment—you will be gazing into the face of one of 
the new homeless. Give a friendly toot of the horn as you 
drive by and consider stopping and dropping a fiver or a 
ten spot into a hand that is mangled and scabbed-over 
by psoriasis…Don’t worry, it’s not contagious, (Jacobs, 
Aug. 2010). 
Jacobs attempts several things here. By providing details as though 
he were a character in a scene, he works to engage the readers’ 
imaginations as if they are encountering him not only on the page 
but on the street. Jacobs writes of readers “gazing into the face of 
one of the new homeless,” which could stand for the rhetorical work 
of the series as a whole. His request is friendly and personal so that 
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readers might “give a friendly toot,” and he reassures them that 
they need not worry about catching his psoriasis. He also is putting 
himself in the place of others, imagining his readers’ travels and 
concerns. The overall effect is not only to put a friendly face on 
homelessness, but also to show that Jacobs and his readers are part 
of the same community and could pass one another on the street. 
The phrase that resonates most strongly is Jacobs’s “should you 
encounter,” as it may be read both as a hypothetical and as a 
question of social obligation. Do readers look Jacobs in the face and 
allow themselves the risks and obligations of such an encounter, or 
do they pass him by? Empathy, and the self-other overlap in 
particular, is directly concerned with ethical obligations and 
encounters, textual and otherwise. 
By the second article, Jacobs has started to doubt his invitation 
to this encounter even as he continues to emphasize the self-other 
overlap. At the end of “Hostile Toward Homelessness,” he notes the 
size and commonalities of the near homeless community at the 
extended-stay motel where he is living. He writes,  
My path converges with the path of the schoolchildren, 
backpacks and textbooks in tow, their voices loud and 
cheerful as they scatter across the sprawling grounds of 
the Budget Suites. So many families live here, so many 
people struggling as I am, and I cannot help but feel that 
we are invisible to the community at large, (Jacobs, Sept. 
2010). 
Jacobs demonstrates the self-other overlap in the temporary 
housing that he and his neighbors are forced to accept as they 
attempt to maintain somewhat normal lives. He asserts that their 
lives retain significance to the larger community—that they as a 
community are there struggling, seeing their children off to school, 
living at the motel—even if much of the larger community would 
ignore them.  
Some readers devalue the idea of community through their 
arguments that the community does not owe Jacobs anything, as if 
you can have a community without commitments to others. A more 
interesting move is that which uses the self-other overlap to shift 
attention to one’s own experiences. This occurs in comments that 
leverage empathy as a way of critique. It is similar to what Hoffman 
describes as “egoistic drift,” when one’s self-focused empathy 
becomes empathizing with oneself at the expense of the other 
(Hoffman, 2001, 56). These moves demonstrate ways of affirming 
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the value of empathy even while denying Jacobs’s own claim to 
empathy and, through that, denying the standing of community in 
general. That denial may be in the form of offering one’s own story 
as a way to validate one’s judgment of Jacobs. Such an argument is, 
in effect, that I understand your experience, and because I 
understand your experience I can critique it and discount it. For 
example, Thia writes, 
I have empathy for you Mr. Jacobs, I know what daily 
pain is like, I know what it is like to be angry and defiant. 
I know what it is like to have your body fail you. The 
thing is no one owes us anything. You, sir, are asking for 
charity and compassion as if it is your right as if your 
plight is everyone's concern and problem. The truth is it 
is not their problem; the truth is many who are working 
make it on less money than you have (Jacobs, Sept. 
2010, post 106).  
Thia bases her empathy on her personal experience in situations 
supposedly similar to those facing Jacobs. Although she writes that 
she has empathy, she argues for an understanding of community in 
which “no one owes us anything.” The self and other that Thia 
present here do not overlap, resonating with conservative 
ideologies that undermine the possibilities of empathy. Thia uses 
her expression of empathy as a way to undercut the social work of 
empathy. Similar moves are made by other commenters who relate 
stories of being homeless and how they drew upon their own 
resources to improve their situations, confirming a conventional 
morality of independence and self-reliance. Arguing against 
empathy in this mode may be an attractive option for commenters 
because it allows them to assert their own position as empathic 
individuals while denying Jacobs’s claim to empathy. This point is 
important because empathy holds strong status as a positive social 
value. Those denying empathy do not want to deny empathy based 
upon of the value of empathy itself. Instead they deny empathy 
based upon questions of entitlement and individual responsibility.  
Much more common in the comments is affirmation of the self-
other overlap. This occurs in the form of quotes and commonplaces, 
such as when tonyasal4369 writes, “There but for the grace of God 
go I” (Jacobs, Sept. 2010, post 263). Some comment that Jacobs is 
not so unlike others in the decisions he has made. Askmrmark 
responds to criticism of Jacobs and Michael eating at a Denny’s, 
apparently an unsightly indulgence to some readers, by writing, 
“Give them a break, folks. You would do the exact same thing when 
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you get in this position” (Jacobs, Sept. 2010, post 186). Some 
commenters validate the social condition of self-other overlap by 
writing that they understand Jacobs’s situation because they have 
had similar experiences, further underscoring the argument that 
Jacobs’s situation is not unique. They use their positions as 
community members and as readers and commenters to argue that 
others should see Jacobs as not so dissimilar from themselves. For 
example, Kausinkonfusion writes, “You two do not deserve the 
ridicule that was bestowed upon you in your 1st article (or the 
articles to come), and I told you face-to-face, I am in similar shoes 
as you both, and in life you can not possibly always have the ‘right’ 
choice to be made” (Jacobs, Sept. 2010, post 65). The self-other 
overlap is a complex condition that may be evident in many of the 
types of statements related to Jacobs’s series: in recognizing one’s 
place in a community, in arguing for similar possibilities and 
vulnerabilities to suffering, and in making the case for the 
significance of one’s own life in relation to the lives and concerns of 
others. It is at the heart of empathy. 
At Stake in the Social Conditions of Empathy 
Jacobs’s series garnered media attention well beyond Las Vegas for 
what it said about social conditions and the ways that people relate 
to one another in times of economic distress. The reaction was 
consistently one of dismay at how the responses of the commenters 
suggested a further breakdown in community during the Great 
Recession. For example, Choire Sicha writes in The Awl, 
The constant reminder of the American lack of empathy 
is astounding. It's everywhere...And so it was with great 
wariness that I approached the comments section at the 
end of this first-person story by a man in Nevada who, 
driven into destitution by disability, family medical bills, 
the current lack of work and shady landlords, will find 
himself homeless at midnight tomorrow. These 
comments: well, they did disappoint. They went from 
awful to judgmental to trashing to witch hunt (Sicha, 
2010).  
The quality of the comments also concerns Susan Bruce at the AFL-
CIO’s Working America blog. She writes, “The lack of compassion 
is troubling—but the level of anger is even more disconcerting. I 
suspect that the anger some people have for the homeless is fueled 
by their own fears that they are only a paycheck or two away from 
being homeless themselves” (Bruce, 2010).  It is a denial of 
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personal vulnerability via self-other overlap that Bruce views as 
fueling angry reader responses. For Sicha and Bruce, the reader 
comments begin to eclipse the articles themselves as the most 
significant rhetorical events within the series due to how the 
readers argue against empathy and how their comments draw 
attention to debates concerning our positions and obligations to 
others. 
As ethical considerations—and as considerations that have been 
shown to contribute to altruistic or pro-social action (Batson, 
2011)—the social conditions of empathy contain rhetorical and 
practical consequences. Empathy makes demands based upon our 
memberships in communities. The social conditions of empathy 
support the position that we are owed something by others, even if 
only common regard. This is part of being human. Vetlesen argues 
as much when he writes of the connection between the human and 
the moral: “The link is such that the perceived human reality of a 
situation involving the weal and woe of others addresses me, calls 
upon me, lays a moral obligation on me because I am, see myself as, 
and wish to be able to continue to see myself as a human being” 
(Vetlesen, 1994, 10, emphasis in original). He adds that such 
recognition requires a participatory, rather than a detached, 
attitude. This is what is at stake in the social conditions of empathy, 
whether people assume a participatory rather than a detached 
attitude. To recognize and support the social conditions of empathy 
is thus to view oneself as part of that human—and perhaps also 
nonhuman—community, so that one might succeed or fail in 
keeping the terms of membership in that community, the first 
expectation of which is the equal regard of others. The 
consequences are evident in Jacobs's series. Once one empathizes, 
it is more difficult simply to continue to the next article and leave 
Jacobs and others like him to their fates while resting easily and 
confident that those fates are not shared.  
Debate over the social conditions of empathy demonstrates how 
these conditions are reinforced or undermined. It also bears on my 
primary claim, that empathy is not only an individual matter. 
Empathy itself is presented throughout the series and the 
comments as a positive social value, so attention to responsibility 
and self-other overlap stand in for empathy as they are the 
conditions that support it. Many commenters may be resistant to 
Jacobs’s claim to empathy because they are afraid to acknowledge 
their own perilous positions, which points to the demands that 
empathy makes on us and our relations, even in how we understand 
ourselves and our own vulnerabilities. Precarious positions can 
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hinder empathy because, as Hoffman writes, people are less likely 
to empathize when they are themselves in uncomfortable or 
unstable positions (Hoffman, 2001). A precarious society is a less 
empathic one. Furthermore, as Bracher notes, most people 
externalize and attack their vulnerabilities or negative attributes in 
the form of others, so that they can remain “largely ignorant of just 
how similar they are in the depth of their selves or souls to those 
they consider to be the dregs of humanity” (Bracher, 2009, 55).  
Identity is among the most fiercely guarded of personal 
concepts. To open up one's identity to questioning and to 
acknowledge vulnerabilities is a frightening prospect, especially for 
those who are not so secure in their conceptions of self or in their 
social standing. The social conditions of empathy matter because 
they inform the ways that we understand ourselves and our 
relations and responsibilities to one another. The importance of 
context in Jacobs’s series and the disputed nature of empathy 
suggests we need a greater appreciation of situation in our study of 
empathy and the conditions upon which is it enabled and 
suppressed, if we are to see that empathy should be viewed as a 
rhetorically mediated social phenomenon. The setting of Las Vegas 
also is a significant factor, as it was then the national leader in 
foreclosures, adding a sense of communal, and not just individual, 
instability. Jacobs felt that he had to escape this situation if he was 
successfully to solicit the empathy of his readers and his 
community. His solution was to move to a different community, 
one he at least expected would offer greater possibilities for 
empathy. Jacobs and Michael both left Las Vegas for California. In 
researching this essay, I learned that they both died in 2016 
(Mailander, 2016). 
A rhetorical perspective pushes our understanding of empathy 
in new directions. It demonstrates that empathy is not something 
contained within our heads so much as something that emerges in 
social encounters and that depends upon out social values, 
positions, and how those inform the ways we read and respond to 
one another. These are the social conditions of empathy, the 
structures of relation and discourse that support or inhibit 
empathic responses. A rhetorical perspective reminds us that 
empathy is unevenly distributed, that some people are considered 
more entitled to it than others are. Considerations of Jacobs’s 
status as a victim, his personal responsibility for his situation, and 
his place within the community are not so much about Jacobs 
himself as they are about the values attributed to those social 
positions and what it means to be a member of a community. A 
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rhetorical perspective of empathy shifts our attention from 
individual appeals to the social conditions that structure and 
determine the validity of those appeals so that we are able to ask, 
Who gets to be empathized with? Who gets to empathize? And what 
are the implications of that empathy or its absence? 
The unfortunate irony of empathy is that precisely when 
empathy is most needed, when division and inequalities are 
greatest, the social conditions that support it often are at their 
weakest. During the Great Recession, for example, the economic 
factors that pushed more people toward homelessness also pushed 
others to attempt to reassure themselves and imagine that they did 
not share the vulnerabilities that made their neighbors homeless. 
This response is of concern during a time of increasing income 
inequality, physical vulnerability, political partisanship, and social 
division. A rhetorical perspective on empathy foregrounds 
questions of the relationships between self and other, imbalances in 
power and positions, and how we might work to bolster the social 
conditions that enable more empathic relations.  
Copyright © 2018 Eric Leake 
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